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Autistic Spectrum Disorder in Prehistory
Catriona Pickard, Ben Pickard & Clive Bonsall
Individuals with ‘extraordinary’ or ‘different’ minds have been suggested to be central to 
invention and the spread of new ideas in prehistory, shaping modern human behaviour and 
conferring an evolutionary advantage at population level. In this article the potential for 
neuropsychiatric conditions such as autistic spectrum disorders to provide this difference 
is explored, and the ability of the archaeological record to provide evidence of human 
behaviour is discussed. Specific reference is made to recent advances in the genetics of these 
conditions, which suggest that neuropsychiatric disorders represent a non-advantageous, 
pathological extreme of the human mind and are likely a by-product rather than a cause of 
human cognitive evolution. 
contribution to society. However, extraordinary minds 
or different minds models raise a number of issues:
• the potential societal benefits of neuropsychiatric 
disorders;
• the extent of prehistoric tolerance and integration;
• the nature of the genetic inheritance of neuro­
psychiatric disorders;
• the threshold between ‘neurotypic’ and ‘extraordi­
nary’ minds.
In this article it is proposed that although the evo­
lutionary development of humans can be correlated 
with the emergence of neuropsychiatric disorders, 
these conditions were a deleterious by­product of this 
evolution rather than part of the causative mechanism. 
This will be explored with specific reference to autistic 
spectrum disorder (ASD), a modern clinical classifica­
tion that encompasses both Asperger Syndrome and 
autism. 
The potential societal benefits of ASD 
Autistic spectrum disorder encompasses a group of 
conditions with varying degrees of severity, ranging 
from Asperger Syndrome to autism. Autism is con­
sidered one of the most severe childhood psychiatric 
disorders resulting in impairment of verbal and non­
verbal communication, abnormality of imagination, 
and failure to develop normal social relationships 
(Baron­Cohen et al. 1985; 1998). Associated symptoms 
include mental retardation, insistence on sameness, 
It has been suggested that individuals with ‘extra­
ordinary’ minds (such as those suffering from neuro­
psychiatric conditions including autistic spectrum 
disorders and schizophrenia) have made a dispropor­
tionate contribution to mankind’s social, cultural and 
cognitive development. For example, schizophrenia 
has been variously linked to leadership qualities, 
creativity and musical ability (Ellenberger 1970; Hor­
robin 2001; Polimeni & Reiss 2002 and see Polimeni & 
Reiss 2003 for review) — according to Horrobin (1998) 
it is precisely these characteristics and schizophrenic 
disorders that have made us human. Furthermore, 
shamanism has frequently been described as a culture­
specific form of schizophrenia or psychosis (Silverman 
1967; Polimeni & Reiss 2002; El­Mallakha 2006). 
The emergence of fully modern human beha­
viour has been linked to the development of social 
mechanisms that integrate individual cognitive vari­
ation or ‘differences of mind’ (Spikins 2009). Within 
this model (which uses autistic spectrum disorders as 
an example of different minds), it has been proposed 
that inclusion and exploitation of extraordinary dif­
ferences of mind confers a selective advantage at the 
‘society’ or population level. 
This model has its basis in Darwinian evolution­
ary theory — beneficial ‘differences’ are a prerequisite 
substrate for natural selection and become more pre­
valent over time. The result is a ‘spectrum of minds’. 
An individual’s position on this spectrum determines 
the likelihood that they will make an extraordinary 
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repetitive movements, and ‘islets of ability’ or ‘splin­
ter skills’ (Ritvo & Freeman 1977; Baron­Cohen et al. 
1985). Individuals with Asperger Syndrome meet 
the criteria for autism but with no impairment of 
language or general cognitive development (Craig & 
Baron­Cohen 1999). The reported prevalence of ASD 
in modern populations ranges from approximately 
1 in 300 births (Fombonne 2003) to greater than 1 in 
70 births (Baron­Cohen et al. 2009). By comparison 
autism is a relatively uncommon condition affecting 
1 in 2000 to 1 in 2500 births (Baron­Cohen et al. 1985; 
Ehlers & Gillberg 1993).
It has been suggested that individuals with 
Asperger Syndrome or ‘high­functioning autism’ may 
have played a role in small­scale societies — poten­
tially acting as a ‘hub’ for the spread of new ideas, 
inventions and different ways of thought (Trehin 2003; 
Spikins 2009, 186). Polimeni and Reiss (2002; 2003) 
also suggested that certain traits common to many 
neuropsychiatric conditions may have provided spe­
cializations beneficial at the population level. Useful 
qualities are defined as obsessive behaviours (Poli­
meni & Reiss 2002), rigid analytical thinking, excep­
tional memory and attention to detail (Spikins 2009). 
These characteristics are suggested to be particularly 
advantageous in the production and development of 
prehistoric technology. Increased standardization and 
efficiency in blade and microblade industries, the use 
of new materials and the production of more complex 
technologies, the emergence of systems of notation, 
and the rapid rate of innovations have been identified 
as archaeological correlates of such behaviour, and 
thus potential evidence for the influence of the autistic 
mind on modern human development (Spikins 2009). 
However, these beneficial characteristics are 
also exhibited by neurotypical minds — they are not 
exclusive to ASD. Conversely, inflexibility in think­
ing, difficulty with planning and organization, and 
adherence to routine, which could be considered 
the antithesis of extraordinary thought, are actually 
diagnostic characteristics of ASD (Ozonoff & Jensen 
1999; Jankowiak 2005). 
Interpretation of cognitive form from the 
archaeo logical record is naturally open to debate. 
Images executed in Palaeolithic cave art have been 
described as exhibiting similarities to those produced 
by ‘savants’ with ASD (Humphrey 1998) — supporting 
evidence, in the view of Kellman (1998) and Haworth 
(2006), that Upper Palaeolithic Homo sapiens may not 
have shared the same cognitive traits or language 
capabilities as humans today. Trehin (2003) proposes 
an alternative explanation: similarities are observed 
between images portrayed in Upper Palaeolithic pari­
etal art and those produced by some autistic individu­
als with splinter skills because autistic individuals 
were responsible for creating these Ice Age works of 
art. Autistic savants may be talented artists, skilled in 
the execution of real­life objects (Baron­Cohen 1999); 
however, commonalities between Ice Age parietal art 
and that of modern autistics are not all­encompassing. 
The use of colour, which is a striking feature of some 
Upper Palaeolithic parietal art, is unusual in art 
produced by individuals with ASD (Kellman 1998). 
The suggestion that individuals with autism were 
responsible for, or influential in, the development 
of art is further complicated by the evidence for 
symbolic or ‘invented’ motifs found in Palaeolithic 
art (Spikins 2009). Baron­Cohen (1999) notes that the 
invented figures represented in parietal and mobiliary 
art are suggestive of a ‘theory of mind’ (see Premack 
& Woodruff 1978) among Upper Palaeolithic artists. 
Theory of mind (ToM), the ability to attribute varying 
states of mind to self and others, is notably lacking 
in individuals with autism and Asperger Syndrome 
(Baron­Cohen 1999).
Spikins (2009) suggested that the attention to 
detail and recall evident in some Upper Palaeolithic art 
need not indicate the contribution of the autistic mind 
but rather that individuals with Asperger Syndrome 
may have been influential in the production of Upper 
Palaeo lithic art. However, it is widely accepted that 
generally creativity is reduced in individuals with ASD 
(Craig & Baron­Cohen 1999). In particular, imaginative 
creativity is impoverished, even in high­functioning 
individuals with Asperger Syndrome (Frith 1972; 
Craig & Baron­Cohen 1999; Turner 1999). Although 
studies have demonstrated that ASD children with 
language development equivalent to a 2½­year­old 
can be taught to play creatively (Stahmer 1995) this 
requires considerable input from skilled therapists 
and such maximization of the potential creativity of 
individuals with ASD is unlikely to have occurred in a 
prehistoric context in the absence of support. Thus, it 
seems unlikely that individuals with autistic spectrum 
conditions would have made a major contribution 
to the inception and proliferation of Palaeolithic art. 
Alternative explanations for its representational style, 
for example the effects of psychotropic drugs on the 
‘normal’ mind, are also viable. Under such conditions 
the normal mind may enter an altered cognitive state 
that can result in the accomplishment of ‘savant­like 
images’ (Humphrey 2002). 
Autistic traits and different minds have also 
been described as beneficial to economic success in 
prehistoric societies. For example, it has been sug­
gested that unique understanding of natural systems 
such as the movement of animals or the weather 
might be attributed, either directly or by influence, to 
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autistic thinking (Spikins 2009). Although individuals 
with ASD may demonstrate exceptional skills in rote 
memory this is associated with an inability to process 
information at the global level, i.e. a failure to see the 
whole picture (Shah & Frith 1993). Additionally, the 
exceptional ability to memorize is restricted to certain 
types of information, particularly ‘unrelated stimuli’ 
(Shah & Frith 1993). Individuals with ASD demon­
strate deficits in memorizing sentences, related items 
and detecting patterns (Hermelin & O’Connor 1967; 
Frith 1970; Tager­Flusberg 1991; Frith & Happé 1995).
Individuals with ‘splinter skills’ tend to focus 
on one aspect of the world around them which fulfils 
their requirements for order and process. That aspect 
is highly likely to be culturally guided — in Western 
society today this can range from a focus on time­
tables, mathematical problem­solving, to naming the 
day corresponding to a birth­date (Folstein & Rosen­
Sheidley 2001; Thioux et al. 2006). The focus does not 
represent an inventive step, merely the honing of very 
specialized skills. Moreover, it may be that the modern, 
regulated, technological, data­driven world is ideal 
for maximizing the potential of the autistic individual 
(Baron­Cohen 2000, 497). 
Prehistoric concepts of tolerance and integration 
Whilst we accept that extraordinary minds may have 
made a disproportionate contribution to cultural 
development in human prehistory, if autistic and 
autistic spectrum minds are to be successfully argued 
as a key example of difference of mind that ‘played 
a singularly important role’ (Spikins 2009, 191) in the 
emergence of fully modern human behaviour, then 
two criteria are essential: (i) the archaeological record 
must reflect the societal capacity to integrate radically 
different minds, and (ii) artefact types, interpreted as 
evidence for the integration of autistic thinking, could 
not have been the product of neurotypical minds.
Spikins (2009) suggested that symbolism (in the 
form of personal adornments, burial ritual and the 
use of red ochre), long­distance communication, social 
rituals, organized use of space, and mechanisms to 
counteract dominance signal the emergence of ‘social 
mechanisms for integration’ from c. 160,000 years ago. 
The subsequent benefits of this integration were sug­
gested to include: the development of new or more 
efficient, standardized or complex technology, more 
efficient exploitation patterns and use of new ecologi­
cal niches (see Spikins 2009, table 5 for the full list of 
suggested benefits). 
However, it is difficult to identify particular 
and complex social and cognitive changes from the 
archaeological record and then make the clear and 
necessary distinction between the sequential integra­
tion and benefit phases of this proposed process. It 
could be argued that the increasing use of personal 
adornment to signify emotional ties and affiliations 
was a mechanism for emphasizing exclusion or 
‘otherness’. 
Moreover, a number of the supposed benefits 
of integrating different minds appear in the archaeo­
logical record some time prior to the emergence of 
biologically modern humans or even among non­
sapiens hominins. For example, several distinct lines 
of evidence imply the use of aquatic resources by 
pre­sapiens hominins. Clam shells were used as tools 
for butchering large mammals at Sangiran, Indone­
sia, c. 1.6–1.5 million years ago (Choi & Driwantoro 
2007). Lower Palaeolithic seafaring inferred from the 
presence of stone tools on Flores Island, Indonesia 
(Bednarik 2003) suggests that early hominins would 
also have been familiar with maritime resources. 
Shellfish, fish and/or sea mammal remains have been 
recovered at numerous pre­ and/or non­sapiens sites 
(e.g. Wymer 1982; Stewart 1989; 1994; Stiner 1993; 
Cleyet­Merle & Madelaine 1995; Barton 2000; Stringer 
et al. 2008; Zilhão et al. 2010) and may have provided 
the essential nutrients required to support increased 
encephalization in Homo spp. in general (Leigh Broad­
hurst et al. 1998) and in Homo sapiens in particular 
(Crawford et al. 2000). It is likely that changing sea 
level has obscured archaeological understanding of 
the full extent to which hominin populations exploited 
marine resources. 
Arguably, composite tools were used in the pur­
suit of large mammals in Middle Pleistocene Europe 
(see d’Errico 2003 for a review). Furthermore, long­
distance movement of raw materials over hundreds of 
kilometres is evident in the Mousterian of central and 
south­central France (Slimak & Giraud 2007). 
D’Errico (2003, 190) has observed that many of 
the archaeological ‘signatures’ of behavioural moder­
nity identified by McBrearty and Brooks (2000) are 
manifest in the material culture of European Middle 
Palaeolithic populations, and thus are of little heuristic 
value. The use of personal adornments and mineral 
pigments by Neanderthal groups highlights the diffi­
culty of linking sapiens­specific cognitive traits to arte­
fact types. Often, evidence for creativity and the use of 
symbolic items by Neanderthals has been dismissed 
as ‘acculturation’ or imitation (e.g. White 2001; Mellars 
2005; 2010). However, finds of shell adornments and 
the use of red and yellow pigments at the Spanish sites 
of Cueva de los Aviones and Cueva Antón calls this 
into question (Zilhão et al. 2010). Significantly, both 
sites date to c. 50,000 bp millennia before the appear­
ance of anatomically modern humans in this region. 
360
Catriona Pickard et al.
Zilhão et al. (2010) concluded that cognitive­genetic 
explanations for the appearance and use of personal 
adornments and pigments are inadequate. 
Altruistic behaviour and the care of physically 
incapacitated members of society have been inferred 
from the pre­sapiens fossil record (see Hublin 2009 for 
review). Although such evidence is controversial, and 
alternative interpretations have substance (Hublin 
2009, 6429), it has been observed that chimpanzees 
likely exhibit altruism that extends beyond survival of 
offspring and kin (Hublin 2009). Altruism, and poten­
tially inclusivity, may not, therefore, be sapiens­ or even 
hominin­specific traits. However, if (and this is debat­
able) the appearance of personal adornment reflects 
the emergence of more clearly defined social ties/
alliances and the integration of different minds from 
c. 160,000 years ago, this does not necessarily imply 
that ASD differences of mind were being exploited to 
confer a selective advantage at the individual or popu­
lation level. We must be cautious in the assumption 
that prehistoric societies would be able to support the 
additional needs of the ASD individual in particular to 
the extent that they could ‘exploit’ their ‘autistic talents’ 
(cf. Spikins 2009, 193). Present­day medical care and 
educational provision are designed to maximize the 
potential of the individual diagnosed with ASD (see 
Matson et al. 1996 and Goldstein 2002 for reviews). It 
is questionable whether the same ability to realize 
the full potential of each individual would have been 
possible in prehistory. 
In certain traditional societies social relations are 
of greater importance than consideration of individual 
states of mind (Lillard 1997). In such environments 
ASD could be viewed as non­advantageous (cf. Baron­
Cohen 2000, 497). Social competence is reduced in 
individuals with deficits in ToM (Brüne 2006). Poor 
non­verbal communication and an inability to predict 
the behaviour of others are characteristics of both 
autism and Asperger Syndrome (Baron­Cohen et al. 
1999). These might restrict the social role of individu­
als with ASD in traditional societies. The inability of 
those with autism to regulate behaviour through inhi­
bition (Turner 1999) in conjunction with limited verbal 
skills might result in social exclusion, particularly 
in sporadic cases of ASD where behaviour is poorly 
understood or unfamiliar to other members of the 
family group or society at large. Focused or directed 
aggression, which is arguably a useful trait in certain 
social situations, for example when negotiating with 
belligerent neighbours, is not a common feature of 
Asperger Syndrome (Ghaziuddin et al. 1991). More­
over, inadequate comprehension of non­verbal cues 
(Scott 1985) in individuals with Asperger Syndrome 
might further hamper social roles. 
Mode of genetic transmission: ASD genetics and 
potential evolutionary pressures
The central question is whether the hypothesized 
benefits or situational success (Spikins 2009) of an 
ASD mind are responsible for the selection and main­
tenance of the genetic factors that predispose toward 
these conditions. This would imply that the disease 
is the evolutionary beneficial state, increasing the 
likelihood of reproduction and passing on the genetic 
predisposition factors to the next generation.
The details of the transmission of genetic pre­
disposition to ASD have recently been clarified and 
provide a basis for determining the validity of this 
hypothesis (Freitag et al. 2010). Firstly, it is clear from 
twin and family studies that there is a substantial 
genetic contribution to autism, even though many 
of the instances of the condition are apparently spo­
radic (i.e. without evidence of a family history). This 
apparent discrepancy can be explained by the fact 
that ASD is a complex genetic condition resulting 
from the interplay of many genes and many different 
forms and strengths of genetic mutation within those 
genes. For example, large, genome­wide association 
studies suggest there are a number of small­effect but 
common genetic susceptibility variants (termed single 
nucleotide polymorphisms) for autism (e.g. Zhao et al. 
2007). The number and combination of these within 
an individual dictate whether they will go on to 
exhibit the sporadic form of ASD. Additionally, data 
from cytogenetic, copy number variation (deletions 
or duplications in the genomic DNA sequence) and 
linkage studies suggest there is an alternative genetic 
mechanism that tends to be rarer but stronger in effect 
(higher ‘penetrance’) (Zhao et al. 2007). Because of 
the stronger effect of these latter genetic risk factors 
they tend to be observed as inherited traits running 
in families — albeit with variable expression on the 
Asperger/autism scale. In such high­risk families the 
rate of inheritance is 50 per cent in male children (Zhao 
et al. 2007). Additionally, copy number variants can 
also appear de novo in individuals — i.e. they appear 
sporadically in the first carrier but show familial 
inheritance in subsequent generations. This observa­
tion is particularly important because de novo instances 
of genetic ASD indicate that the prevalence of ASD 
is likely to be fairly constant moving back through 
history and into prehistory. Perhaps where there is 
inheritance of traits, there might have been some form 
of support structure enabling the individual with ASD 
to be fully included in society. 
As well as discussions of the potential benefits 
of ASD gene variants in prehistoric societies, there 
is also an expanding literature on the genetic causes 
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and consequences of the emergence of modern 
human cognition (Vallender et al. 2008). Spikins (2009) 
suggested that the manifestation of ASD with its 
associated genetic underpinnings might have made a 
significant contribution to the evolution of the modern 
mind. Most genetic studies point to the emergence 
and establishment of Homo sapiens as the stage when 
evolutionary processes responsible for increased brain 
function (cognition) were most rapid (McHenry 1994; 
Enard et al. 2002; Caceres 2003; Vallender et al. 2008). 
This is manifest as a set of genes involved in brain 
development and function that bear the hallmarks 
of evolutionary action. In fact, these genes show a 
greater overlap with schizophrenia risk genes than 
those associated with ASD. In other words, ASD is likely 
a consequence of modern human cognition rather than an 
integral part of its formation. 
Threshold genetics: too much of a good thing
It has been suggested that conditions like ASD and 
schizophrenia arose as a consequence of the rapid 
evolution of the human brain (Crow 1997; 2000; Ran­
dall 1998). As such, neuropsychiatric conditions may 
be an unfortunate side effect of the massive cognitive 
development that distinguishes humans from other 
primates (Crow 2000). The higher brain functions that 
provide humans with the advantageous cognitive, 
behavioural and social skills, enabling them to adapt 
to particular environmental and social pressures, are 
the very same functions that malfunction in neuro­
psychiatric disorders. In this way, there is an overlap 
in the gene variants that have been positively selected 
as advantageous in this capacity and the set of genes 
that have been linked to psychiatric disorders. Studies 
have demonstrated just such a link between human 
evolution and the positive selection of mental illness 
genes (Crespi et al. 2007).
This observation can provide a mechanistic 
grounding to explain why the common, small­effect, 
ASD predisposing gene variants have remained at 
appreciable frequencies in the population (rather than 
disappearing through negative selection pressure). 
Rather than being harmful, the predisposing variants 
may individually have beneficial qualities (Crespi 
et al. 2007), only becoming harmful when many are 
inherited simultaneously. 
Therefore a ‘happy medium’ model applies with 
such genetic variation. The tweaking of brain function 
by the accumulation and selection of particular genetic 
variants in the human population overall seems clear 
cut. However, if we consider the fact that the segrega­
tion of these variants is random, then some individu­
als will be carriers for just a few, whereas others will 
possess many. There would exist a threshold beyond 
which too many of such gene variants carried by one 
individual would push that individual from a healthy 
(and advantaged) state into a pathological disease 
state. Therefore, the question becomes one of where 
precisely the threshold between positive and harmful 
effects lies. The advantage only exists when the vari­
ants are present in a sub­threshold quantity and not 
when they result in disease pathology. The relatively 
low frequency of sporadic ASD in the population adds 
weight to the argument that it is a disease condition 
resulting from an infrequent constellation of genetic 
influences rather than being a successful difference of 
mind in evolutionary terms.
This argument is strengthened by considering de 
novo copy number variants leading to ASD (Sebat et al. 
2007); they have a pathological mutational mechanism 
through the loss or gain of genes, which are naïve to 
any influence of evolutionary selection, and yet they 
have clinical features indistinguishable from those 
individuals who have ASD through the accumulated 
genetic variation model described above. Thus a clearly 
pathological process produces a condition identical to 
that which some propose to be a source of benefit.
Differences in mind occur at the population level. 
However, the majority can be classified within a broadly 
defined norm. Therefore, contributory people in society, 
in terms of innovation, invention and creativity, need 
not necessarily be outside of this norm despite the 
recent attention given to the relationship between 
neuropsychiatric conditions and extraordinary contri­
bution to, or status in, society. For example, some have 
attempted to shoehorn a diagnosis of schizophrenia 
on certain cultural archetypes such as shamans (e.g. 
Demerath 1942; Silverman 1967; Scheff 1970). How­
ever several authors propose that shamanic states of 
consciousness have also been over­pathologized. Noll 
(1983) and Walsh (1993) stipulate that shamanic states 
of consciousness are not equivalent to schizophrenic 
conditions, while Stephen and Suryani (2000) argue 
that the role of the initiatory crisis has been overplayed 
in Western accounts of Balinese shamanism. Moreover 
Crow (1997; 2000) has presented a convincing case for 
schizophrenia as a disadvantageous by­product of the 
evolution of language. 
Similarly, many prominent historical figures 
described as geniuses in their particular field have been 
posthumously diagnosed as having ASD (Lyons & Fit­
zgerald 2005; Walker & Fitzgerald 2006) or, alternatively, 
schizoid tendencies (Horrobin 2001). The inference 
from such diagnoses is that the contribution of autistic 
and other extraordinary, and specifically male, minds 
to technology in particular, and to wider society in 
general, has been very significant (e.g. Fitzgerald 2004). 
362
Catriona Pickard et al.
However, it is likely that genius has also been over­
pathologized in such revisionist studies (Sacks 2004). 
Sacks’s studies of the lifestyle and behaviour of Einstein, 
Wittgenstein and Newton led him to the conclusion that 
they were unlikely to have suffered from ASD (Sacks 
2001; 2004). The many and varied diagnoses of Van 
Gogh’s illness (see Blumer 2002 for a review) highlight 
the difficulty of attributing neuropsychiatric conditions 
retrospectively. In similar vein, Kellman (1998) noted 
that gifted artists with autism are no more common 
than gifted artists with ‘normal’ minds.
Conclusions
Although it is possible that there was a change in 
behaviour that resulted in the inclusion of different 
minds within society from c. 160,000 years ago, the 
archaeological and fossil evidence to support such an 
assertion remains contentious. It is perhaps premature 
to assume that the talents or splinter skills of indi­
viduals with ASD could be exploited by prehistoric 
societies in such a way that those skills would confer 
a population­level advantage.
While it is straightforward to integrate differ­
ences of mind and their advantageous by­products 
into the evolution of modern human cognition, it is 
unlikely that social changes that resulted in acts of 
integration and ‘exploitation’ of individuals with ASD 
or other neuropsychiatric conditions led to, or were a 
principal component of, the emergence of fully mod­
ern behaviour in humans. There is a complex genetic 
component to fully modern human cognition and 
behaviour which was/is vital for the success of Homo 
sapiens. However, this produces a normal distribu­
tion of benefit with autistic spectrum disorders and 
other neuropsychiatric conditions representing the 
pathological manifestation of the extremes of genetic 
permutation occurring in the population gene pool.
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